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Introduction 
"Syrian-American relations have deteriorated markedly in recent years. " 
~Syrian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Bushra Kana/ani 
Hezbollah. Hamas. The Islamic Jihad. Rogue nation. The axis of evil. These are 
features commonly used by the United States government, Western media outlets, and the 
American people to describe the Republic of Syria. Syria is a major player in geopolitics 
and relevant to the stability of the Middle East. Its relationship with the United States, 
therefore, is of central importance in reaching the United States goal of peace in this war-
ravaged region of the world. The erosion of normal diplomatic relations with Syria since 
the middle of the twentieth century led to serious setbacks for peace and stability in the 
Middle East. Only with a clear and focused look at the history of the relationship 
between the United States and Syria can one understand when and why things went awry. 
Why did the relationship between Syria and the United States fail? Looking back 
through the key events of the relationship between the United States and Syria can 
provide an explanation for how the relationship devolved and, by knowing these factors, 
suggestions can be made for how to re-establish proper diplomatic relations. Once the 
decay of the relationship is understood, then Americans can better attempt to move 
forward with a new policy designed for cooperation with Syria. In the course of their 
relationship, the United States and Syria have become increasingly hostile and this 
hostility eventually led to the cancellation of formal diplomatic relations. The 
deteriorating relationship between the United States and Syria can be attributed to 
specific historical moments that set up the basis of their relationship. Why has the 
relationship never improved over all these years? Questions such as this will be answered 
in the course of the paper. 
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Many Americans, the media, and, most importantly, our policymakers in 
government see Syria as an authoritarian, repressive, and religiously volatile nation on 
the border ofIsrael. It is consequently seen as a major threat to the United States. By 
viewing Syria as a viable option for partnership in the Middle East and more than an 
antagonistic member of the "axis of evil," the United States can open a path to real and 
sustained peace between Israel and Palestine. Syria gives shelter and aid to anti-Israel 
terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. Syria is one of the major 
countries in the Middle East preventing peace in Israel and, thus, improving United 
States-Syrian relations and Israel-Syrian relations will have a measurable impact on 
political stability in that region. Also, Syria is Iran's biggest ally in the Middle East, and, 
it is a source of support and a funnel for Iranian soldiers to invade Lebanon and attack the 
Israeli borders. 1 Improved relations with Syria will decrease the necessity for Syria to 
have a strong alliance with Iran and thereby decrease the prospects of regional dominance 
by the regime in Tehran. The third reason United States policy with Syria needs a new 
direction is that Syria allows insurgents into Iraq, where they wreak havoc on United 
States and Coalition soldiers. Quite simply, improved relations between the United States 
and Syria will save lives in Iraq and throughout the region. A friendly relationship forces 
Syria to secure its Iraqi border and prevent insurgents from entering Iraq because Syria 
no longer has the incentive to support Iran and thwart United States efforts in Iraq. 
America cannot afford to continue the past policies and must forge ahead with a 
concerted effort to create a lasting tie with Syria. Syria must also make efforts to change 
its diplomatic patterns as well. They must cease hostilities with Israel, crack down on 
1 Syria formed an alliance with Iran during the Lebanese Civil War, when Syria called 
upon Iranian help to succeed in keeping power in Lebanese politics. 
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anti-Israel terrorists and halt providing a passage for insurgents into Iraq in order for 
progress to be made. Both nations must provide good faith initiatives to show a serious 
attempt at reconciliation for change to occur. 
To explore the origins of the hostility between the United States and Syria and to 
gain insight into how history shapes the present, I used a variety of sources of 
information. Much of the research is based on monographs. I started broadly with 
Middle Eastern history and culture, and then focused on Syrian history and the current 
status of the United States/Syrian relationship. I used the texts of established scholars in 
the fields of Middle Eastern history and politics, Israeli-Palestinian history, and United 
States/Syrian relations. I utilized the availability of government sources, including 
documents maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Department 
of State, the United Nations, and online sources tracing Syrian history and culture. As the 
hostility between the two countries continues, I also utilized contemporary news sources, 
including daily newspapers and monthly periodicals, to gain insight into the continued 
issues facing the relations between the United States and Syria. I ended my research by 
conducting interviews with Syrian experts Professor Joshua Landis of Oklahoma 
University and Professor Gregory Orfalea of Georgetown University. 
A description of modem Syrian history, leading up to its initial contacts with the 
United States, will serve as background to the main thesis of the paper. In it I will detail 
the beginnings of United States/Syrian relations, the major influences on them over the 
course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries such as: the birth ofIsrael and the 
Israeli-Arab conflicts, the 1990's peace negotiations, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. I will 
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conclude with a list of options for the administration ofBarack Obama to act on in order 
to improve our relations and hopes of achieving our goals in the Middle East. 
Methodology 
My analysis ofthe history ofthe relationship between America and Syria rests on 
the theory of Historical Institutionalism. B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and Desmond King 
describe Historical Institutionalism's arguments as, 
"Historical Institutionalist arguments stem from two major intellectual 
developments in the 1970's and 1980's: First, the renewed scholarly interest 
among comparative political sociologists in the state as an analytic concept 
(Evans, Rueschmeyer, and SkocpoI1985); and second, the analytical significance 
ascribed to institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, in western 
democracies for explaining behaviors and policy choice (Hall 1986). 
The new institutionalists' principle claim was that once formal and informal 
arrangements were institutionalized in a modem polity, they assumed a certain 
rigidity - that is, were difficult to alter - and furthermore, provided an 
explanatory framework for subsequent policy outcomes.,,2 
My use of the theory consists of analyzing how institutions within the 
American/Syrian relationship created a rigid framework for each country's behavior and 
policy. The concept argues that institutions such as politics, economics and society 
follow patterns and create a script of available behavior over time. Barrington Moore, a 
chief exemplar of Historical Institutionalism, expresses it as a belief of" ... certain 
philosophers, historians, and philosophically inclined political scientists who assign to 
ideas an outstanding role in the development of economic, political, and social 
institutions.',3 Ideas and perceptions, along with ideology, concrete data and cultural 
2 Peters, Guy, Jon Pierre, and Desmond King. "The Politics of Path Dependency: Political 
Conflict in Historical Institutionalism." The Journal of Politics 67.4 (2005): 1275-1300. 
JSTOR. Web. 19 Mar. 2010. Pg. 1279-80. 
3 Moore, Jr., Barrington. "Foreign Government and Politics: The Influence of Ideas on 
Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia." The American 
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norms, all combine to factor into decisions. Moore posits that to neglect these ideas and 
perceptions can lead to a dangerously shallow understanding of a situation. 
Historical Institutionalism argues a correlation between contributing factors and 
the present state of affairs; it is a study of how A+B+C~Event. A, B, and C are the 
independent variables/threads that throughout the course of the Syrian/American 
relationship led to the dependent variable/present situation. Historical institutionalism is 
a means by which prior events and institutions that shape human behavior are explored in 
order to reveal how contemporary political action arises. It shows the correlation 
between these institutions or threads that were created over time and how they led to the 
present status ofthe relationship, which is derivative of the script the threads formed. 
Thus, it is a way to find how the present came to be shaped by previous actors and events. 
The use of Historical Institutionalism lends itself to history and political science because 
it uses the institutions of politics such as governments, agencies, and militaries to seek the 
impact of their actions on the present. 
The actors in the relationship are impacted by history, are history, and shape the 
future of the relations by what they do in the present. History shapes the behavior, or it 
shapes people who in turn take political action. An important factor for determining how 
these actors and events shaped the relationship and its path is their timing. The political 
environment of any day and age has long term implications through its molding of human 
perception and behavior. Thus, the day's events are correlated with future results. The 
timing of the confluence of actions and actors impacts these events. Historical 
Institutionalism argues that the history of the United States/Syrian relationship created 
Political Science Review. 41.4 (1947): 733-743. JSTOR. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stableI1950650>.Pg. 733. 
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tendencies that shaped the relations and the way out of the present quagmire is to 
recognize how history led to the present situation. 
I read Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions as an example of a well-
known work that uses Historical Institutionalism. Skocpol describes the theory " .. .in 
which the overriding intent is to develop, test, and refine causal, explanatory hypotheses 
about events or structures integral to macro-units such as nation-states," and "Basically 
one tries to establish valid associations of potential causes with the given phenomenon 
one is trying to explain.,,4 Skocpol's work compared revolutions in Russia, France, and 
China. Her study comprised of "France, Russia, and China will serve as three positive 
cases of successful social revolution, and I shall argue that these cases reveal similar 
causal patterns despite their many other differences. In addition, I shall invoke negative 
cases for the purpose of validating various particular parts of the causal argument.,,5 Her 
intent with the book is that "It offers a frame of reference for analyzing social-
revolutionary transformations in modem history. And it uses comparative history to 
work out an explanation of the causes and outcomes of the French Revolution of 1787-
1800, the Russian Revolution of 1917-1921, and the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1949.,,6 
While Skocpol conducted a multi-country comparative study, her work remains relevant 
to my research. Skocpol's study exposes the importance of identifying and connecting 
causal factors. Skocpol's work is a comparative study, but I adopt it to my historical 
4 Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, and China. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press. 1979. Pg.36. 
5 Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of the France, 
Russia, and China. Pg.37. 
6 Ibid. Pg. xi. 
- ----------------------------------------------------
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analysis of one case, the Syrian/American relationship, due to its emphasis on the 
causation within institutions. 
Here I seek to test my theory that recurrent themes wrote a script that led to the 
present status of American/Syrian relations. For my purposes, I have found that the 
associations in the Syrian/American relationship revolve around these pieces: military 
conflict with Israel, United States military intervention in the Middle East and peace 
negotiations between Syria and Israel. These will be the independent variables from 
which the deteriorating relationship developed. Syrian military conflicts with Israel act 
as the primary factor hurting the Syrian/American relationship. Syria's continued state of 
war with Israel, the several traditional military confrontations and Syria's support of 
violent resistance groups serve to constantly strain America's relations with Syria. 
American military intervention in the Middle East also impacts the relationship. The War 
in Iraq is on Syria's doorstep, and the meagerly protected Syrian/Iraqi border allows 
insurgents in to attack American troops. American military presence impacted the most 
recent phase of the American/Syrian relationship. The United States -brokered peace 
negotiations present the most direct interaction between America and Syria. It has the 
ability to redirect the dynamic ofthe relationship and is a driving factor in the desire to 
improve the relationship. Top officials and leaders of Syria and America continue 
discussions of this process and the importance they allot to the peace process reveals how 
important is the Syrian/American relationship. These three events, reoccurring over time, 
present the thread that defines the American/Syrian relationship. The current state of the 
American/Syrian relationship is the dependent variable. The three independent variables 
led to the current relationship. 
~--------------------------------------------------
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Also, the actions made by Syria and America were done without a grand, all 
knowing plan that spans the entire length of the relationship and was consistent 
throughout all the various actors. Over time, the decisions were forced into a narrow 
mindset due to the dynamics of the relationship. This occurred due to perception of the 
present due to the past. As Barrington Moore concluded, the train of thought established 
is difficult to vary from. There is a drive within humans to follow the path laid before 
them. Leaders stay within the preordained framework and view the present through this 
narrowed lens, leading to an incomplete vision. An example is the actions ofthe George 
W. Bush administration toward Syria. Bush and his officials used previous events to 
solidify their perception of the present Syria they were dealing with. Bush's continuation 
of prior policy and narrowed his perception of the modem Syria he was confronted with. 
The three independent variables will support the argument that the relationship's course 
was not predetermined, but rather influenced by prior decisions to create a framework of 
perception in the present. 
Barrington Moore's short piece, "Foreign Government and Politics: The Influence 
ofIdeas on Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia," also 
typifies a Historical Institutionalist approach. Moore wrote the piece in an effort to 
"make a modest contribution toward a more exact understanding of the relationship 
between ideas and political and economic changes and stimulate further discussion ofthe 
topic through a careful analysis of one important case: the development of the goal of 
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collectivized agriculture in the Soviet Union.,,7 He wrote the piece in 1947 with the 
specific purpose of applying it to American policy. Its purpose was, 
"If the United States government is to achieve a successful adjustment in world of 
rapid economic and political change, the country's leaders will need an accurate 
understanding of the factors behind these changes, and the probable directions of 
such change. Such understanding cannot be obtained without knowledge of the 
major factors involved, such as material conditions and abstract ideas, and the 
relative importance to be attached to each one ... there is no general agreement 
concerning the procedures to be followed in evaluating symbolic and ideological 
data, such as statements by important foreign leaders, programs of political 
parties, and the like, as opposed to more concrete data such as information on 
natural resources, economic trends, and similar matters."g 
His research produced a conclusion that gave five propositions for how the relationships 
of actors play out to reach an eventual goal. Moore's importance lays in these 
propositions because they outline how to assess and analyze a relationship. Three of 
propositions are relevant to this paper. They detail the foundation of Historical 
Institutionalism and its view of relationships over time. The first of which is that 
"out of this awareness of various tensions, there develops, by both logical and 
non-logical processes, a series of goals or objectives. These goals are proposed 
ways of dealing with the tensions as they are felt and interpreted. The goals, 
together with the analyses and interpretation of the tensions, constitute the chief 
elements in political programs, or any given economic or political ideology.,,9 
This proposition establishes the driving forces behind Historical Institutionalism. 
Without the established goals, governments do not have a direction. By outlining a goal 
or objective, it follows that there must be a path to achieve it. Thus, the ideology or 
7 Moore, Jr., Barrington. "Foreign Government and Politics: The Influence ofIdeas on 
Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia." The American 
Political Science Review. 41.4 (1947): 733-743. JSTOR. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950650>.Pg.733.4 
g Moore, Jr., Barrington. "Foreign Government and Politics: The Influence ofIdeas on 
Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia." Pg. 733. 
9 Ibid. Pg. 734. 
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policy is created and with it the first step in narrowing the perceptions of possible actions. 
Identifying a potential problem, recognizing the desired goal, and crafting a means to 
achieve the goal constitute the formulation of a policy. This policy then becomes the 
force behind views and actions of the interactions between the nations. This plays out in 
the Syrian! American relationship as Moore proposed. The tensions of Syrian conflict 
with Israel created an image of Syria in America. The conflicts also served to create the 
American objective of protecting Israel and the goal of reaching a peace between Arabs 
and Israelis. Our means to the end became supporting Israel in its pursuit of security. 
The next proposition is, 
"If the given political or social group under consideration has an opportunity to 
put some of its objectives into practice, new problems and tensions may result 
from these actions. The effort to adapt to these tensions is likely to result in a 
partial modification of the original set of goals and analyses. In this adaptive 
process new goals may be developed and old ones discarded or retained ... ,,10 
This reveals the constantly changing nature of any situation or relationship. 
Attempts to solve the problem can lead to new problems of their own. It marks a 
fundamental point of emphasis in the theory - nothing is permanent. Indeed, the situation 
is always in flux. After the peace negotiations of 1999-2000, both Syria and America 
departed from their previous policy. Syria departed from American influence and 
augmented its relationships with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Similarly, the George w. 
Bush Doctrine departed from Clinton's policy of engaging Syria. Instead, Bush chose to 
isolate and condemn Syria. The result of these policies was the complete malfunctioning 
of a working bilateral relationship between the two. An attempt to solve the problems of 
the relationship in turn changed the dynamic of the relationship and worsened it. 
10 Ibid. Pg. 734. 
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The third relevant proposition states, 
"At the same time, within a given group a certain stability in goals, analyses, and 
actual political behavior is maintained ... it appears that there is no complete 
reversal of the earlier ideology. In this way the variety of possible adaptations of 
any given political group seems to be rather limited."]] 
Within the state of an ever-changing situation, a time-tested stability exists. The 
first proposition that created an objective and policy toward achieving that objective 
forms the unchanging mindset of how to reach it. This sets up the main argument of 
Historical Institutionalism, that the institutions within a situation make it difficult to 
expand the perception of that situation. It restricts options due to the precedents set and 
provides a framework to explain the outcome of the policy. The American policy to 
support Israel exemplifies this because, no matter what, America will not separate itself 
from Israel. Also, the Syrian goal has been to reclaim the Golan Heights. Syria has 
adapted to current political conditions over time, switching between violence and peace 
to reacquire the Golan, but it remains Syria's primary goal. The Americans and Syrians 
might change tactics, but the goal remains the same as before. It is by seeing the 
continued use of these original policies that analyzing the present is possible. 
Why are positive relations between America and Syria the goal you might ask? 
The mere aspiration for good relations among the United States and Syria means there 
was a breakdown in thinking and action. Historical Institutionalism reveals the forced 
perceptions that occur due to prior events between American and Syria, which allows one 
to pinpoint why the path of the relationship was non-sustainable. This non-sustainable 
path is where the contemporary status of the relationship exists and why there is a need to 
redirect the approach America takes to our Syrian relationship. It is simple enough to say 
]] Ibid. Pg. 734-5. 
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that there are factors that negatively influenced the American/Syrian relationship, but 
Historical Institutionalism unveils how these influences force changes in perception and 
thus create a path of action. 
The United States should desire amicable relations with Syria because of the 
potential positives that relationship creates in the Middle East. Syria as an ally can lead 
to peace and stability in the region. This new relationship also deprives Iran of its chief 
ally. The approach of Historical Institutionalism reveals the frame the Syrian/American 
relationship has developed in and a systematic investigation reveals how this dynamic 
between the two countries is irrational. Each nation used faulty logic when appraising 
situations, and this led to a shrinking framework of decisions and eventually to the 
current poor relations. 
The concept of Historical Institutionalism does not imply that history is 
preordained nor does it suggest that events cannot deviate from a path. That is more of 
what Path Dependency subscribes to. Margaret Levi defines Path Dependency as thus 
"once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. 
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.,,12 Path Dependency asserts 
that actions get locked into place because the precedents set create an environment 
insurmountable to break away from. Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency are 
strongly related because both attribute history with forcing the present and both discuss 
paths that are created by precedent. Yet, Path Dependency is more deterministic in its 
approach to analyzing history than Historical Institutionalism. Paul Pierson, whose 
12 Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 2004. Pg. 20. 
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works use Path Dependency and explore its definition, positives, and limits, describes 
Path Dependency as, "The process of Path Dependence, in which a preceding steps in a 
particular direction induce further movement in the same direction, ... To put it a different 
way, the cost of exit - of switching to some previously plausible alternative - rise.,,13 
Path Dependency finds how events are locked into place because they must follow the 
precedent set before them. What Historical Institutionalism means is that the history 
creates a foundation for the contemporary political setting, wherein contingency also 
plays an important role in deciding the impact of an event, as do its actors and timing. 
Each decision is not independent from the previous ones; rather, it builds on them. In this 
specific scenario, due to the history of the United States and Syria's relationship, certain 
actions and decisions were made because leaders felt they must be. The actions of the 
1960's are relevant to the decisions being made today. They helped to create the frame in 
which the decisions are being made. Decision-makers were hamstrung within a much 
narrower framework than originally existed due the patterns which were constructed. 
The behaviors of each leader followed the precedent set by prior decisions and continued 
shaping the pattern the relationship fell into. Over the course of the twentieth century and 
early twenty-first, the frame of the decisions grew smaller and smaller, forcing certain 
decisions to be made. The existence of contingency and radical changes in policy was 
still present and could have occurred over the course of this relationship by both nations. 
But my focus will stay on trying to explain what impacted the relationship to drive it into 
this narrow frame I described above. This paper will detail the threads that impacted the 
13 Pierson, Paul. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." The 
American Political Science Review 94.2 (2000): 251-267. JSTOR. Web. 21 Mar. 2010. 
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American/Syrian relationship and how those threads forced a perspective upon the 
leaders throughout time. I explain why Syria and the United States could not implement 
their full arsenal of policy and treaty options when attempting to resolve their issues, 
common problems and ideological differences. The explanation discusses the way the 
leaders' perspectives of the situations were skewed due to the history between America 
and Syria, and it accentuates these as points of change in the relationship. 
Throughout this piece I focus on these essential features that drive the 
relationship. The military conflict with Israel, American military intervention in the 
Middle East and peace negotiations between Israel and Syria will serve as the events 
driving the decisions of the primary actors to follow the path suggested by history. That 
path led these two nations away from amicable relations. By the end I pinpoint certain 
ways to counter this history and use it in a way to strengthen the relationship of the two 
nations. 
Background 
Syria has a proud and rich cultural history than dates back to some of the earliest 
civilizations in recorded history, such as the Phoenicians around 3000 BC to the 3rd 
century BC.14 According to the United States Department of State, "Syria was occupied 
successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, 
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines, and, in part, Crusaders before finally 
coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks.,,15 Syria is a small nation in the heart of 
the Levant, the area traditionally known to be the countries ofIsrael, Syria, Lebanon, 
14 Khalaf, Salim George. "History of the Phoenicians." Phoenician Encyclopedia. Salim 
George Khalaf, 2010. Web. 14 Mar. 2010. <http://phoenicia.org/history.html>. 
15 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgnl3580.htm#>. 
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Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and parts oflraq. It is no surprise then that Syria's 
neighbors are Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Jordan. Syria is a strict secularist nation, similar 
to Turkey in this societal respect. Its population of 21.7 million people (excluding the 
roughly 40,000 people living in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights) consists of74% 
Muslim, 16% Christian, and 10% Jewish, giving it the second highest Christian 
population in the region after Lebanon. 16 Damascus is the capital city and center of 
culture, and it was settled around 2500 BC. 17 It is believed to be one of the oldest 
continuously inhabited cities in the world, which is a marker of Syria's historic culture. 
Damascus was the capital of the Umayyad Islamic Empire formed around 660 A.D. and 
was influenced by great Greek Stoic and Neo-Platonist thinkers. 18 Another proud aspect 
of Syrian history is that Syrians are attributed with the invention of the first alphabet, 
known as the Phoenician alphabet, which was modified by the Greeks around 8th century 
B.C. Syria holds importance for the Christian religion because it was the scene ofthe 
Crusades, a series of military campaigns by Christian Europeans to reclaim the Holy 
Land circa 1100-1300 AD. Syria was either a target or travel route for the Christian 
armies during much of this time. Syria also holds a special historical relationship to 
Christianity, "Syria is significant in the history of Christianity; Paul was converted on the 
road to Damascus and established the first organized Christian Church at Antioch in 
16 "Syria." CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, Mar. 2010. Web. 14 Mar. 
2010. <https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world -factbookl geosl sy .html>. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Hitti, Philip Khuri. Syria, a Short History; Being a Condensation of the Authors 
"History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine. New York: Macmillan, 1959. Pg. 1-
2. 
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ancient Syria, from which he left on many of his missionary journeys.,,19 The Syria 
known today is a product of colonialism and the carving up of lands by European powers. 
The land known as Greater Syria, or Syria before Western colonialism included Jordan, 
Israel, parts of Turkey and Lebanon.2o Its ancient size directly influences Syria's desire 
to influence Lebanon today. Syria's location offered it an opportunity to create trade 
along travel routes with the West and also within the Middle East?1 Syrians have always 
been in the middle of politics in their region and now is no different. It holds economic 
and military prospects as a crossroads for travelers, armies, and trade. Its central location 
also has political qualities. Its position in the region makes it prime for any power 
wishing to control the Middle East. This is one reason Syria was often under the rule of 
empires and regional powers. But, at the opening of the twentieth century, Syria was far 
from having any impact on its neighbors due to the control of the Ottoman Empire. 
At the tum of the twentieth century the Turkish Ottoman Empire was in its 
waning years of dominion over Syria. The Ottomans came to Syria 1517 and remained 
there for the next four hundred years.22 Ottoman Syria existed as Greater Syria and 
included Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, and parts of Turkey 
and Iraq. The Ottoman rule was harsh on Syria and World War I brought upon Syria the 
venting of Ottoman frustration with the course of the war. New technology and superior 
soldiers of the Europeans overpowered the Ottoman army. It feared for its survival on the 
19 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgnl3580.htm#>. 
20 Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and Military, 1945-1958. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1964. Pg. 5. 
21 Hitti, Philip Khuri. Syria, a Short History; Being a Condensation of the Authors 
"History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine. New York: Macmillan, 1959. Pg. 3. 
22 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgnl3580.htm#>. 
18 
world stage. So the Ottomans cracked down on Syria, hoping to maintain control of this 
land. This was done through increased oppression of the Syrian people. With the defeat 
of the Ottomans, the French created a Mandate over the land that is now modem day 
Syria and Lebanon.23 The United States Department of State cites on its Syrian history 
page, 
"In 1920, an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established under King 
Faysal of the Hashemite family, who later became King of Iraq. However, his rule 
over Syria ended after only a few months, following the clash between his Syrian 
Arab forces and regular French forces at the battle of Maysalun. French troops 
occupied Syria later that year after the League of Nations put Syria under French 
mandate. ,,24 
The French established control of the government in Syria, but since the 
Ottomans ruled Syria they did not have many modem institutions of their own set up. At 
this time, Syria possessed antiquated political, social, and economic institutions. The 
French brought Syria into the twentieth century, starting with its political institutions, 
modernizing them and creating a working government. The French did not care for 
Syrian independence. They created spheres of power as public officials and behind 
closed doors by controlling local Syrian officials. Phillip Hitti, author of Syria: A Short 
History, explained the mood of Syrians during French rule as, "The Syrian people felt the 
French rule was worse than Ottoman domination.,,25 At this time, these were a people 
who yearned for freedom. French rule was corrupt, conducted by favoritism and 
23 Hitti, Phillip Khuri .. Syria, a Short History; Being a Condensation of the Authors 
"History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine. Pg.235-9. 
24 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eiibgnJ3580.htm#>. 
25 Hitti, Philip Khuri. Syria, a Short History; Being a Condensation of the Authors 
"History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine. New York: Macmillan, 1959. Pg. 
242. 
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governed by military men?6 The French Mandate left a deep scar on the Syrian people 
and laid the foundation for decades of harsh, military rule. 
Syria gained its independence when a reluctant France recalled its troops and 
officials on April 17, 1946. From 1948 to 1970 an upstart Syrian nation was plagued by 
instability in government. The leadership in Syria was a revolving door with coup d' etats 
being the most frequent form of political action. Many of the early leaders were military 
men and so they used their support in the army to take over the capital and replace the 
existing government. Such turmoil was exemplified by the three coups during the year of 
1949 alone. Surprisingly these coups were notably bloodless. The Syrian government 
found one thing it could agree on in 1948. The newly created Syria found an immediate 
nemesis with the creation of the Jewish nation oflsrael in 1948. These two countries 
fought several times over the course of the twentieth century and each time Israel was 
victorious. In 1958 a struggling Syria joined regional power Egypt to form a socialist 
pact known as the United Arab RepUblic. By forming this union, Syria hoped to open 
the door to other Arab nations to join as well. The Syrians were fierce supporters of Pan-
Arabism, the belief that Arabs should act as one and create a broad Arab union. At the 
time, Syria was plagued by political instability, which led to apathy towards government 
by the Syrian people.27 It was still feeling the impact of the turbulent shakeup from so 
many coups in a relatively short period of time. So they turned to Egypt the largest 
regional power at the time in a hope to start a coalition that would come to include the 
rest of the Arab states. The State Department gives three main reasons for Syria joining 
26 Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and Military, 1945-1958. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1964. Pg.15. 
27 Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and Military, 1945-1958. Pg. 22. 
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Egypt, "Syria's political instability during the years after the 1954 coup, the parallelism of 
Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's 
leadership in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis created support in Syria for union with 
Egypt.,,28 This union lasted from 1958-1961. It failed when the Syrian people and 
government rejected Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser's overreaching, socialist rule 
and overthrew the government in Damascus. 
In 1967, Syria and Egypt battled Israel after a string for border clashes raised 
tensions to a breaking point. Israel preemptively acted and Israeli troops pushed Syrian 
forces back from the Golan Heights. This war brought Israel in control of the Golan 
Heights. The occupation ofthis area by Israeli forces has become the major dispute 
between the two countries ever since then. Much Syria says and does is geared at 
reclaiming the Golan Heights. It is also significant to note that after this military 
campaign Syria cut off all diplomatic ties with the United States and since then they have 
never returned to a truly proper state of affairs. 29 
In 1970 the last coup in Syria occurred. The Ba'th party came to power in Syria 
under leaders Salah Jadid as President and Hafez al Assad as Defense Minister. The 
Ba'th Party in Syria stresses socialism, secular Arabism, and seeks to form Pan-Arab 
allegiances. 3o Assad slowly disagreed more and more with Jadid over military matters 
and international affairs. In November 1970, Assad collected his supporters within the 
28 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eiibgnl3580.htm#>. 
29 Ma'oz, Moshe. "Damascus vs. Washington: Between the 'Axis of Evil' and 'Pax 
Americana.'" Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About North Korea, Iran, and Syria. 
By Bruce Cummings, Moshe Ma'oz, and Ervand Abrahamian. New York: New York 
Press, 2004. 157-213. Pg. 188. 
30 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
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21 
military and government to arrest Jadid along with his followers and complete a 
bloodless transition of power. On March 12, 1971 Hafez al Assad was elected the 
President of Syria by 99.2% of the electorate.3! This figure speaks to the style of Syrian 
government. The authoritarian rule forced people to vote for Assad and if they did not it 
was rigged so he won anyway. Assad ruled until his death in 2000 and was succeeded by 
his son, Bashar al Assad, the current president. 
The thirty years of Hafez al Assad's rule brought Syria an unprecedented 
powerful, centralized regime, domestic stability and regional influence. His rule created 
the Syria many see today. Assad's reign created five new features central to the 
operations of contemporary Syria: 
One, a Constitution emphasizing the power ofthe Executive Branch; 
Two, an informal network of top civilian and military leaders used to maintain control; 
Three, the expansion of the state's security apparatus to ten agencies designed to secure 
political hegemony; 
Four, the establishment of the Ba'th Party as a major political force; 
Five, a reliance of charismatic leadership to control Syrian society.32 
Today Syria is a run by Bashar al Assad who replaced his father as the undisputed 
leader of Syria. He has expressed a desire to negotiate for peace between Syria and Israel 
pending the return of the Golan Heights. He has also offered an outstretched hand to 
cooperate with the United States and restore a proper relationship. However, Syria still 
houses Hamas and Hezbollah and filters insurgents into Iraq. It also remains a strong ally 
31 Ma'oz, Moshe. "Damascus vs. Washington: Between the 'Axis of Evil' and 'Pax 
Americana.'" Pg. 175-177. 
32 Ibid. Pg.177, 8. 
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of Iran. These are the issues that must be challenged if a functioning relationship is to be 
created. Syria offers a contradictory nature. It claims to desire peace with Israel, yet 
supports terrorists designed to destroy Israel. It also claims to want peace in the region 
but helps groups determined to undermine Lebanon and Iraq. The crossroads Syria is at, 
with its potential to increase peace or play spoiler in the region, is why restoring the 
United Sates/Syrian link is a ripe issue in today's political world. 
Part 1: Israel 
The first script that limited United States/Syrian relations is the foundation ofthe 
state of Israel. The birth of Israel in 1948 out of the British Palestinian Mandate created 
an instant state of conflict in the Middle East. Syria took up the torch for Pan-Arabism 
against the Jewish "intruders". The United States support for Israel is the largest 
contributing factor over the decades to the breakdown in United States-Syrian relations. 
Israel is the first reason and will be the last dividing America and Syria. Israel's ties with 
America, its direct opposition of a Greater Syria and Cold War politics are all foremost in 
explaining the deterioration ofthe relationship. 
Before Israel existed, Syrian relations with America can be characterized as very 
good. Before Lebanon separated from Syria, Americans established the Syrian Protestant 
College in Beirut. In fact, after World War I there was a terrible drought in Lebanon and 
Syria. The United States sent Herbert Hoover to provide aid and money. This created a 
great image of America in Syrian eyes and that image remained until the creation of 
Israel. 33 
33 Orfalea, Greg. Personal Interview. 13 Mar. 2010. 
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Starting with the birth ofIsrael and America's instant support and recognition of 
it, Syria felt directly slighted. They could not believe America was supporting the 
existence of this "intruder nation". There were riots in the streets when Syrians heard of 
Israel's independence.34 Syria immediately put troops on alert and led the attack along 
with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. America's immediate acceptance ofIsrael 
showed a direct forging of an alliance with the new nation, and was seen as turning its 
back on Syria. It was a harsh reality to Syrians who hoped for a return of Greater Syria. 
The United States now supported an Israeli nation in the heart of the holy land that 
Syrians viewed not only as rightfully their land, but rightfully Arab and Islamic too. To 
many Syrians, Israel was a western, non-Islamic creation that directly countered their 
dream of a restored Great Syrian Republic. 35 Israel was why Syria could not trust 
America. It was an extension of America's attempt to gain control in areas of the world. 
At the outset, it does not seem that the United States needed to back Israel so 
stoutly. When seeing such a massive outcry by Arab people and governments, is it 
possible the United States could have done more to assuage the fear and anger in the 
region? It seems not. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, authors of The Israel Lobby 
and United States Foreign Policy, offer the explanation that Jewish lobbyists were a 
powerful force behind President Harry Truman's bid for reelection in 1948, and so 
beyond Truman's moral and humanitarian sympathies, large donations helped stay his 
hand in deciding to back Israel's birth. Truman sympathized deeply with the European 
Jewry after knowledge of the Holocaust spread, this was another reason Truman 
34 Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and Military, 1945-1958. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1964. Pg. 105. 
35 Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2002. Pg.381-2. 
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supported the creation of Israel and backed it so strongly. Truman's instant 
acknowledgement and defense of Israel's right to exist was fresh in the minds of Syrians 
and left a sour taste in their mouths during a pivotal time at the beginning of the Cold 
War. The presence oflsrae1 in the Middle East and America's alliance with it rose as the 
first tension between the United States and Syria. This tension, as Barrington Moore 
explained, led to America's goal in the region and the policy enacted to meet that goal. 
Syria was a threat to Israeli security and thus America created a policy to protect Israel 
and therefore, countered Syrian ambitions to eliminate Israel. 
Another large contributor to the waning of the nascent relationship was Syria's 
military conflicts with Israel. These were the major reasons for hostility between the two 
nations and thus made the United States cautious when dealing with Syria. Israel was 
and is a strong ally to America; if Israel is at odds with Syria, then America must defend 
its ally. It began with the 1948 Arab/Israeli War. When Israel rebuffed what the Arab 
nations threw at them militarily, Syria was beside itself with anger after the defeat. An 
example of Syria's reaction was the public outrage and political fallout for the current 
leadership. The loss was a major reason for the 1949 coup led by Col. Husni a1 Za'im to 
replace the administration held responsible for the embarrassment. Over the years Syria 
and Israel had three military conflicts. They were the 1948 War, the 1967 War and the 
1973 War.36 With each conflict the United States played a bigger role in assisting Israel, 
either with military or other aid. By the time the 1973 war occurred the United States 
was a vital player in ending the conflict and preventing it from growing out of control. 
36 Rather than using the term Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, I feel describing the 
war simply by its year prevents any bias or offense. 
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The 1967 War occurred when Israel preemptively attacked Egypt. Increasing 
tensions between Israel, Egypt and Syria culminated in the events of June 1967. On June 
5, 1967 Israel sent its air force to destroy Egyptian planes and later to attack Syrian and 
Jordanian airfields. Syria went on to lose the Golan Heights during an Israeli offensive 
on June 9. Again, the loss of the Golan Heights proved to become the major reason for 
future hostilities between Israel and Syria. Syria seeks to reacquire the Golan in any way 
possible. The fighting ended June 10 as all parties involved agreed on a ceasefire. The 
end of the 1967 war also saw the severing of SyrianlUnited States diplomatic relations. 37 
The peace hopes seemed dead and the Soviet Union was supporting Syria with what it 
needed. American support for Israel proved absolute and the United States saw no 
benefit in Syrian affairs. 
The next and final direct military conflict between Israel and Syria was the 1973 
War in October 1973. On Yom Kippur in 1973 Syria and Egypt launched simultaneous 
offensives across ceasefire borders in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The 
initial success on the Syrian front surprised the Syrian soldiers and they settled for the 
gains they made. Israel quickly countered and pushed the Syrian forces back further than 
the original borders.38 Both the United States and Soviet Union actively watched the 
fighting play out and supplied their respective sides. It came to a point where each power 
almost joined. The United States and Soviet Union worked with the United Nations to 
quickly agree upon a ceasefire that ended the fighting remaining in Syria. The resulting 
armistice ended any formal military conflicts between Syria and Israel, but Syria remains 
37 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/3580.htm#>. 
38 Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2002. Pg.336-7. 
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in a state of war with Israel today. It established a United Nations peacekeeping force to 
stay in the Golan and oversee the buffer zone between the two countries. 39 The 
disengagement revived the United States/Syrian diplomatic relationship on account of 
America taking a lead role in mediating renewed peace talks between the countries.40 
Every time they met in battle, Israe1's technology outmatched the Syrian army, 
thanks in great part to America. Over time the United States enhanced its support of 
Israel and its right to exist in the region. As a result, the United States was either 
supportive ofIsraeli military operations to protect itself or, at the very least, the United 
States did not debate Israel's right to protect its land and people. The military conflicts 
between Syria and Israel polarized the American relationship with both nations. America 
moved closer to Israel with each military campaign. While the United States backing of 
Israel is unflappable, why did the United States not help Syria? This is explained with 
one simple phrase: the Cold War. 
Cold War politics were another major setback to United States/Syrian relations. 
From the outset ofthe tension between the Soviet Union and America, the Middle East 
was a land caught in the middle between the wooing communist and capitalist powers. 
The Cold War mindset dominated many ofthe decisions made by both Syria and the 
United States over the course ofthe forty-five yearlong ideological struggle. Syria was a 
freshly independent nation in 1946 and so a prime candidate to be influenced by the 
American cause of democracy. Being an infant nation, Syria also sought to establish 
international friends and allies. Unfortunately, from the outset Syrians were frustrated by 
39 Landis, Joshua. Telephone interview. 7 Mar. 2010. 
40 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieiibgnl3580.htm#>. 
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Truman's pro-Israelleanings.41 This was an immediate setback to establishing a 
productive relationship between America and the young Syrian nation. Since many 
Syrians viewed Israel as an American enterprise in the Middle East, some Syrians were 
attracted to the Soviet Union from the beginning. But for the most part, Syrians and 
Syrian government remained true to the ideals of Pan-Arab ism during its early years. Its 
goal was to create a broad coalition among the Arab nations. 
Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President of the United States in 1953 
and served until 1961. Eisenhower saw the Cold War move into a very tense and 
polarizing era. The United States increasingly sought to contain communism. 
Eisenhower also realized the potential of the Middle East as either an ally or a large 
conflict zone. He established the Eisenhower Doctrine specifically for nations in the 
Middle East where communist influence was starting to spread, such as in Egypt and 
Syria.42 It stated that any nation could receive United States economic assistance or 
military aid ifit was being threatened with armed aggression by another nation.43 
Eisenhower saw that with Great Britain and France no longer present in the Middle East, 
a power vacuum existed and the Eisenhower Doctrine meant for the United States to fill 
the space rather than the Soviet Union or Egypt.44 Egypt and the Soviets saw the void and 
sought to establish a strong base of support in the area. Syrians vehemently denied the 
41 Ma'oz, Moshe. "Damascus vs. Washington: Between the 'Axis of Evil' and 'Pax 
Americana.'" Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About North Korea, Iran, and Syria. 
By Bruce Cummings, Moshe Ma'oz, and Ervand Abrahamian. New York: New York 
Press, 2004. 157-213. Pg. 164. 
42 "Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957." United States State Department. United States State 
Department, n.d. Web. 5 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/palho/time/lw/82548.htm>. 
43 Eisenhower, Dwight. "Eisenhower Doctrine." Modem History Sourcebook. Web. 5 
Mar. 2010. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/modl1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html >. 
44 "Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957." United States State Department. United States State 
Department, n.d. Web. 5 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/palho/time/lw/82548.htm>. 
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offer of friendship by Eisenhower. Syria was a nation detennined to follow a path of 
Pan-Arabism. It also viewed the Eisenhower Doctrine as an attempt by the United States 
to be the guardian of the Middle East.45 Remembering their lives under the rule of the 
French Mandate and being so resolute towards Pan-Arabism, the Syrian government and 
people were leery of any offer from America. This rejection of what the United States 
saw as a "no brainer" decision when it came to support and protection greatly turned 
Washington against Damascus. It served to push Syria closer to Egypt and Moscow 
instead of Washington. 
The United States and Syria did not build the best rapport with each other over the 
first years of their fonnal relations. But beyond these public announcements and policies 
there was a secret association between the CIA and the Syrian government. Amidst the 
political tunnoil after the loss of the 1948 war with Israel, the CIA attempted to push 
America's agenda in Syria. With CIA backing, Col. Husni Za'im completed a coup in 
1949. Za'im was a close ally of the CIA while in power and America seemed to have a 
friend in the Syrian government under his rule. However, this did not last long. Za'im 
was promptly replaced by Colonel Sammi al-Hinnawi later in 1949 during the year that 
saw three coups. It was around this time that the CIA began to plan another coup d' etat 
The CIA supported Colonel Adib Shishakli who led the third successful coup in 1949. 
Yet, he was ousted in 1954 and the CIA's efforts were foiled again. One message 
between CIA officials said this ofShishakli: "Adib Shishakli falls clearly short of the 
type of a leader we should like Syria to have, but he might be better than some other 
potential candidates ... consequently we should bide our time and await developments 
45 Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2002. Pg. 302. 
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before taking any positive position relative to his possible return to power.,,46 It appeared 
that the CIA hoped to get a proxy in the Middle East thru Shishakli's rule. Syrians 
accused the United States of attempting to enact a coup and expelled the United States 
Embassy officials. The CIA's involvement in Syria seems to suggest that the United 
States saw the importance of the small nation. It historically was key to many conquering 
armies and empires as a travel route and crossroads for supplies and trade. The presence 
of the CIA indicates that America desired Syria's friendship or at least compliance. Syria 
could have been the pathway for American influence to spread in the Middle East. And 
the shadow operations of the CIA offer insight that the United States wanted to influence 
the events in Syria's political culture, but make it look like genuine democracy in action. 
After these events, Syria was hard pressed to find a reason to trust or to ally itself with 
the United States. 
Given the status of United States actions in Syria through 1957, it is little wonder 
why Syria joined with Egypt in creating the United Arab Republic in 1958. Joining 
Egypt under its president Gamal Abdel Nasser, a socialist, Pan-Arab, anti-West leaning, 
leader of the Middle East's biggest regional power, Syria paired itself with another Arab 
state at war with Israel and who refused to buy into the Eisenhower Doctrine. This 
decision taken by Syria had damaging effects on the relationship with the United States. 
It scoffed at American aid offers through the Eisenhower Doctrine and consistently 
viewed any American intervention as a step toward American domination in the region. 
Syria forged this new republic with Egypt in direct rebuttal of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
46Ma,oz, Moshe. "Damascus vs. Washington: Between the 'Axis of Evil' and 'Pax 
Americana.'" Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About North Korea, Iran, and Syria. 
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Syria followed suit with its own Cold War politics when in 1954 it became the 
first Arab nation to sign an anns agreement with the Soviet Union's satellite, 
Czechoslovakia.47 By 1956 Syria established itself as an ally of the Soviet Union and 
accepted military support from it. This friendship with the Soviet Union was in direct 
opposition to America's ideology and position in the world. Syria allied itself with the 
other superpower, America's new enemy. Syria now became a threat to American safety 
and goals in the world. The Soviet Union gave crucial anns and supplies for Syria's wars 
with Israel.48 America seemed to have little choice in how to view Syria. The United 
States could not offer Syria any military aid because Syria had already become friendly 
with Soviet satellite nations and any military aid to Syria was a direct threat to Israel.49 
We see here how the Cold War handcuffed American and Syrian leaders and legislators 
when dealing with each other. On the principles of ideology and national interest, 
America could not support or maintain overly affable relations with Syria. Syria fell 
under Soviet influence and others near it could have been next. America saw no option 
but to treat Syria as hostile to American safety. The United States would continue to 
work with Syria on the Israel issue, but due to Syria's pro-Soviet leanings, America could 
not offer economic relief. 
These Cold War decisions seem to be cruelly cyclical. The United States could 
not arm Syria because it would be a potential threat to Israeli safety. In tum, Syria turned 
to the Soviet Union for support. This angered America and so President John Kennedy 
47 Ma'oz, Moshe. "Damascus vs. Washington: Between the 'Axis of Evil' and 'Pax 
Americana. '" Pg. 164. 
48 Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2002. Pg.325. 
49 Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. The Israel Lobby and United States Foreign 
Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007. Pg. 52, 3. 
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increased American support to Israel. 50 This only embittered the Syrians and they 
entrenched themselves with Soviet support. All the while these decisions were being 
driven by the judgments of previous leaders. The spectrum of options narrowed with 
each decision, constricting the decision-maker's mind into believing that following the 
Cold War precedent was the only way to proceed. The back and forth actions dug Syria 
deeper in the Soviet arms and away from any American deal. The Cold War strained 
hopes to recover normal diplomatic relations by the United States with Syria. 
Through it all, Israel was center to these events and decisions. The American 
support oflsrael began with its formation in 1948. Over the years Israel and Syria had 
several military encounters in 1948, 1967, and 1973 with each strengthening the United 
States/Israeli bond. The initial 1948 conflict between Israel and Syria was the first in a 
series of tensions that proved to disable American/Syrian relations. Also, the geopolitics 
of the Cold War forced Syria and America to choose their allies. This was yet another 
tension that served to force a perception that a policy must be enacted to disarm the 
potential threat to Israel and now American security. Syria chose the Soviet Union and 
America chose Israel; this became an irreconcilable divide between the two during this 
period. The American support of Israel created such a strong alliance over the years that 
they now have one of the strongest friendships between any two countries. This 
impacted future peace negotiations over the Golan Heights because the United States did 
not pressure Israel to give up the land to Syria. Israel had no pressure so Syria got no 
progress out of the discussions. Syria's military conflicts with Israel created the major 
object to the present day peace deals. Syria lost the Golan Heights and wishes nothing 
50 Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. The Israel Lobby and United States Foreign 
Policy. Pg. 51. 
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more than to get it back. As mediator, the United States seeks to find a common ground 
for agreement, but we support Israel in its assertion that the Golan is theirs. The divide 
between America and Syria over Israel during the Cold War made Syria a hostile nation 
in the American government, media, and citizen's eyes. Syria was at war with our 
biggest ally in the region and now supports the groups who attack it. This view of Syria 
persists today and is how we approach Syria when dealing with it. Our unwavering 
support for Israel and clash against communism created a large divide with Syria, which 
was not easily fixed. After the end of the Cold War in 1991 there was hope about peace 
negotiations between Israel and Syria. As we will see, the post -Cold War Middle East 
was in prime condition for a rejuvenated peace process. 
Part 2: 1990's Peace Negotiations 
"Syria is the key to the achievement of an enduring and comprehensive peace. " 
~ President Bill Clinton 
The peace process between Israel and Syria was and remains a fundamental link 
for the United States and Syria. Long ago America took up the torch of attempting to 
bring peace to the people of the Levant. America believed it could take its friendship and 
leverage on Israel, coupled with its superpower status to facilitate and mediate a peace. 
In a sense, America was using one major institution, its alliance with Israel, as a stepping-
stone to create another thread towards the goal of protecting Israel. That new thread 
became the American brokered peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. It was an 
adaptation on the relationship that became a powerful thread for writing its own script in 
the relationship between the United States and Syria. President Jimmy Carter started the 
first substantive push between the two nations. The end of the Cold War and increasing 
Syrian cooperation led President George H. W. Bush to reengage Syria. President Bill 
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Clinton was the next and most recent president to put a great deal of effort into the Syrian 
track of Israeli/Arab peace negotiations. 
Before getting into the politics and history of the peace negotiation's impact on 
United States/Syrian relations, an explanation of what exactly the Syrian peace talks are 
is needed. There are two main peace dialogues with Israel: one is with Syria and the 
other is with the Palestinian Territories.51 The Syrian peace process revolves around the 
Golan Heights. The Golan Heights is an area ofland on the border of Syria and Israel 
that was taken by Israel during the 1967 War. It is widely viewed by organizations such 
as the United Nations, the European Union, Amnesty International and the nations of the 
United State and the United Kingdom to be Syrian land occupied by Israel. It is a breach 
of international law that Israel holds and claims ownership of the Golan.52 United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 242 states that Israel must leave the occupied Syrian 
land. It says, "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from all territories occupied in the 
recent conflict. .. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political sovereignty of 
every State in the area.,,53 Syria wants the land back; that is the first and largest item of 
contest between Syria and Israel. According to Jimmy Carter, the terms for a 
Syrian/Israeli Golan Heights peace accord were as follows: 
A) A multinational peace force for border protection; 
51 The Palestinian track peace negotiations involve the Palestinian Territories of the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank. The major obstructions that must be overcome in this peace track 
are: affirming and recognizing land as Palestinian; what to do with the Palestinian 
refugees spread all over the region and massed in refugee camps; whether Jerusalem will 
be Israeli, Palestinian, neither or both; and the security of borders. These factors are very 
intensely debated and contested by both Israelis and Palestinians. 
52 Landis, Joshua. Telephone interview. 7 Mar. 2010. 
53 United Nations. UN Security Council. Resolution 242. N.p.: United Nations, 1967. 
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B) Israel has a right to the East of the Sea of Galilee for North - South travel; 
C) Surveillance and early warning systems in place; 
D) A peace that is equal to Egypt and Jordan's peace with Israe1.54 
These are the basic premises that must be agreed upon and met for a lasting peace. 
The problem is getting mutual trust and good faith to translate into substantive actions. 
The terms for peace are not very disputed in this situation unlike the Israeli/Palestinian 
peace track. Yet, just like the Palestinian track, the Syrian peace track has its history of 
progress and setbacks. 
The peace process began as an offshoot of the 1973 War cessation process. With 
the conclusion of the 1973 War, the United States took on a larger and more active role in 
Syrian/Israeli Peace.55 Syria, under its still new leader, Hafez al Assad, along with 
Egypt, launched a surprise attack on Israeli occupied lands in the Sinai and Golan 
Heights. Israel repelled the Syrian army and eventually attained more land on the Golan 
than it previously held. The Israeli offensive was called off after the United States 
stepped in to cease hostilities. Assad, seeing the amount of sway the United States held 
over the Israeli government, realized that to get the Golan Heights back he needed 
American help.56 From that point forward, the United States has been instrumental in 
attempting a peace between the two. Of course, there are others who can broker a peace, 
but Hafez Assad felt only America could help Syria regain the Golan Heights. His 
54 The general format of which is recognition ofIsrael's existence, an end to the state of 
war between the two nations and a relinquishing of occupied lands. 
55 Goldschmidt, Jr., Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. Colorado: 
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thinking was molded by the previous experiences of American intervention in Israeli 
military affairs, which demonstrated the significant impact Washington had on Israel. 
Hafez felt it was his duty to return the Golan to Syria, mostly because he was the 
Defense Minister in 1967 when it was initially taken by Israel. 57 It was personal for him 
and all the more meaningful ifhe could reclaim it for Syria. His first attempt to reacquire 
the Golan with force failed. Assad quickly understood his military could not overpower 
Israel's military forces nor could Syria accomplish his goal without international help. 
Following the cease-fire representatives of the Geneva Conference set a goal of peace 
between Arab nations and Israel. However, Assad was frustrated that President Carter 
would not be attending so Syria's chairs at Geneva were empty.58 Assad felt that only the 
chief executors of the nations would suffice in a discussion. His narrow window of 
operating forced Syria to boycott the Conference. One positive that came from the war 
was that Syria resumed diplomatic relations with the United States.59 Assad did this in 
the hope of coaxing the American officials to begin peace negotiations. Again his 
perception of the situation was influenced by the power of the United States in Israel. 
Later in the decade, Carter hosted Egypt and Israel at Camp David. These peace 
talks in 1978 led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979.60 Just as in the past when the 
United States did not show preference to Syria, so Assad turned to Moscow in 1980 for 
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aid.61 Due to the Carter Administration's lack of attention to the Syrian track, Assad felt 
his only course of action was to stick with the Soviets. According to Joshua Landis, 
"Syria wanted America's help in getting a peace with Israel. Syria offered the same thing 
as Egypt for the Golan Heights.,,62 But the Carter administration focused on Egypt 
because it was the large Arab power rather than little Syria. As it was, Assad saw the 
situation and believed his only recourse was turning to the Soviets and finding other ways 
to win back the Golan Heights. 
In 1976 Syria sent troops into Lebanon; reportedly, "President Hafiz al-Asad 
intervened in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Maronite Christians.,,63 Assad wanted 
to increase Syria's influence in Lebanon in an attempt to raise Syria's clout in the region. 
Also, Assad was motivated because of Lebanon's historic importance to Syria and its 
economy. In fact, Stephen Glain believes Lebanon is more important to the Syrian 
economy than the Golan Heights.64 According to Robert Baer, Syria interferes in 
Lebanon because "it is crucial to Syrian economy and image.,,65 (Also, Syria and 
Lebanon were one before the French partition.) This dropped American interest in peace 
and continued to be a cause for concern for the United States until Syria withdrew in 
61 Ibid. Pg. 192-3. 
62 Landis, Joshua. Telephone interview. 7 Mar. 2010. 
63 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/3580.htm#>. 
64 Glain, Stephen. Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants: The Economic Collapse of the 
Arab World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005. Pg.75. 
65 Baer, Robert. The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower. New 
York: Crown Publishers, 2008. Pg. 188. 
37 
2005. Syria's domination of Lebanon and its affairs was a historical concern that began 
in 1976.66 
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon after years of border conflicts. Syria held the 
torch for Arab unity and resistance to Israel, so Syrian forces battled Israeli troops to 
protect Arab land. But Syria was not strong enough and needed Iran's help in defeating 
Israel. 67 This began the forging of a strong alliance between Syria and Iran, which now 
threatens Israeli safety and American interests in the Middle East. This further drove 
peace out of the minds of Americans involved in Syrian relations. Increased violence 
against Israel coupled with a growing relationship with Iran did not project a desire for a 
peaceful solution to the Israeli conflict. 
In 1989, Syria and the United States consulted to help Syria agree on the Taif 
Agreement. The Taif Agreement ended the civil war in Lebanon and called for staged 
withdrawal by Syria and Israe1.68 Benny Morris viewed the Syrian influence in Lebanon 
as a "puppet master of its government.,,69 Syria's control in Lebanon was one point the 
United States government disapproved of and eventually led to the Syrian Accountability 
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and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. This sanctioned Syria and led to their 
departure from Lebanon.7o 
Towards the end of the 1980's Hafez Assad felt he had a reason to be optimistic 
for American/Syrian relations. The election of George H.W. Bush came without the 
support of the Jewish community. To Assad, this was great news and he quickly thought 
it could be a turning point in relations. As proof of his willingness to reach out to 
America, Assad and Syria supported the United States against Iraq in Kuwait. 7! Syria and 
the United States also worked closely on the Taif Agreement, which ended the decades 
long Lebanese civil war, restored Lebanese rule to the southern area that Israel took over, 
and legitimized the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The work between America and Syria on 
the Taif Agreement was a small step in a series of actions leading to the 1990's peace 
negotiations. Soon after the war Assad got his opportunity to sit down and talk with a 
United States president and negotiate peace with Israel. In 1991, Assad accepted George 
H.W. Bush's invitation to attend a Middle East peace conference and engage in bilateral 
discussions with Israel afterward.72 These meetings started a decade of cooperation and 
improved relations with Syria made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
post -Cold War world brought a thawing of relations between the United States and Syria 
and the medium used to better relations were peace talks. Just as Barrington Moore 
concluded, there are efforts to adapt policy and goals in the course of the relationship. 
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Syria began opening to the idea of a peace agreement, but kept within the realm Moore 
suggested. This realm was reclaiming land from Israel. Syria began its hostility toward 
Israel because it felt Israel stole land from it and other Arab peoples; now it is slightly 
adapted to focusing on the Golan Heights. But as we will soon see, these improvements 
did not last nor did they result in the desired goals for Syria. 
In 1992 Bill Clinton was elected president and with him came vigor for the Syrian 
track peace talks. Assad was always a captivating man and drew the attention of 
American presidents due to not only his character but also his position in Middle East 
politics.73 Clinton became quite fond of Assad and the two grew close over the eight 
years they shared as chief executives. Assad truly liked Clinton; he saw him as a person 
really interested in a peace.74 Clinton adapted the traditional policy towards Syria of 
campaigning with them to drop their arms and attempt peace. Clinton brought Syrians 
and Israelis together to discuss land and security issues. The decade of the 1990's saw 
the greatest advance in Syrian/Israeli peace negotiation and, with it, Syrian/American 
relations. Assad's preference for Clinton made him receptive to peace talks more than 
Carter or any other president before. Assad's decision about Clinton meant that peace 
was getting a real chance and at the same time the relations with the United States were 
improving. Clinton put the Syrian track to the front of national policy. Clinton seems to 
have noticed Assad's attitude towards him and saw an opening. But it was not the easiest 
task. Negotiating with Assad was a test of one's will, nerves and intellect. 
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Dennis Ross was the special Middle East coordinator under the Clinton 
Administration. He met with Assad and other top Syrian officials often while in that 
position. Ross described Assad as a "very detailed negotiator" and that Assad wanted a 
peace deal to look like a Syrian victory.,,75 According to Aaron David Miller, a Middle 
East analyst and negotiator who worked in the State Department for over twenty years, 
Assad's negotiating style was "minimalist" in effort and he expected 100% of the profit 
in the accord.76 He saw what other peace agreements were with Israel and wanted to get 
more and give less than any other.77 Given these traits, his attention to detail, stubborn 
demands and emphasis on public opinion, it is clear why it was difficult for any 
negotiations to produce a conclusive agreement. 
Over the course of 1999-2000, Bill Clinton had Assad and Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak at the brink of an agreement. Both sides wanted peace and worked hard to 
get far into the negotiations. Barak offered to withdraw the Israeli presence in the Golan 
Heights in exchange for Syria's willingness to recognize Israel and provide security 
arrangements. Yet, in the final stages there was a dispute over a sticking point in the 
Golan. Israel offered it but could not let go. According to Professor Joshua Landis, 
"America hasn't had the political resolve to push Israel the last step.,,78 This proves what 
Barrington Moore projected about such relationships: objectives might be adapted, but 
they will never deviate fully from the original policy goal. In this instance, Clinton 
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pushed peace talks to the forefront, yet he could not stop America's firm support of Israel 
and push Barak enough to close the deal. The discussions stalled, and in 2001 Ariel 
Sharon replaced Barak as Prime Minister. George W. Bush replaced Clinton as president 
in 2000. Hafez Assad died in 2000 and was replaced by his son, Bashar Assad. The 
three top actors in the peace talks were no longer sitting at the table and the peace slipped 
out of reach. Since then discussions have not been brokered by the United States. The 
transitioning ofleadership brought new perspectives on the peace talks and history of the 
relationship between the countries. Syria became vengeful, Israel remained determined 
to keep its land, and America renewed its position of antagonism against Syria. 
The concept of peace negotiations for Syria and Israel brought America close to 
Syrian officials and politics in a time when Syria no longer had the Soviet Union for 
support. It created a reason for America to care about a country we could have easily 
been written off as a former Soviet ally and that would be the end of things. The peace 
negotiations gave something for the United States to invest in Syrian affairs and the result 
was the best relations between the United States and Syria and the closest to peace the 
Syrian track has ever seen. The actions and decisions of Assad, Carter, the elder Bush 
and Clinton influenced one another over time. Assad desired Carter's attention but got 
nothing significant out of the most peace-oriented president for the region. Assad 
receded back to the Soviets until Bush and Clinton became president. Assad's good 
"vibes" with Clinton helped him believe that peace was attainable and that the Clinton 
and the United States could deliver. Yet, this peace was elusive and lost at the eleventh 
hour. The failure ofthe peace process in indicative of just how difficult it is to shake the 
precedents of this relationship. No matter how close the United States and Syria grew 
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during this time, the history of the relationship proved too much to overcome. Trust 
could not last because America would not push Israel, and so Syria saw we were not 
ready to give up our unwise (in this case) support oflsrael. America's alliance with 
Israel would not be reoriented to push Israel the last step in finishing the peace. The 
result became the end of negotiations and the complete collapse of Unites States and 
Syrian relations. 
The fallout of the failed 2000 peace agreement set the tone for the policy and 
relations of the George W. Bush era. Syria was left empty handed after what they viewed 
as ten years of good actions and open negotiations. Barrington Moore's proposition that 
new avenues to reaching a goal can produce new tensions themselves is evident here. 
The unsuccessful peace created a renewed hostility between Syria, Israel, and America. 
The result in Syria was a firm determination to never be tricked by Israel and America 
agam. They increased their relations with Barnas and Bezbollah in the resistance against 
Israel. Syria also keyed in on Iran as their closest ally to fight Israel. Ifthere was no 
peace, then there was war and this company was the kind of people Syria associated 
with?9 Syria began playing the political game. In order to get their land back and a 
peace, they needed to give Israel an incentive to make the peace. This incentive was and 
remains resistance fighter and the threat of a nuclear Iran. This was what Syria saw and 
still sees as the only way to gain leverage on Israel in the peace negotiations.8o The 
collapse of the peace negotiations entrenched Syria's connections with these hostile 
actors and institutions of resistance. On the opposite side of the equation, the failure of 
the peace talks exemplified America's historic dedication to supporting Israel. It also 
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continued America's institutional policy of skewing the balance of power in the Middle 
East towards Israel's favor. 81 We will see soon that the new Bush policy was aimed at 
hurting Syria and alienating it on the world stage, beginning the new institution of 
containment for challenging Israel. 
Part 3: Bush Era 
"Syria is a key factor in any overall regional peace, but President Bush has refused to 
support Syria's peace talks with Israel on the Golan Heights or even engage Syria on a 
bilateral basis. " 
~President Jimmy Carter 
The presidency of George W. Bush was the single most destructive time for 
American/Syrian relations. The events, actions and attitudes of the Bush Doctrine set any 
hope of reconciling America and Syria far adrift. A confluence of international events 
and military endeavors put Bush in a position to either move forward with Syria or retreat 
from the progress made during the past decade. Bush's neoconservative approach to 
Syria departed from the script the Clinton administration laid before him and instead of 
continuing to work with Syria for peace, we disengaged. The events of September 11, 
2001, our military operations in Iraq and our recent policy towards Syria all contributed 
to getting the American/Syrian relationship to where it is now. 
The tragedy of9/1112001 reverberated across the globe. Scores of nations came 
to America's side with support. Syria was no exception. The young Syrian president 
Bashar al Assad responded clearly to Washington. Syria offered the CIA and United 
States intelligence information they gathered on AI-Qaeda operatives and leaders. Syria 
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helped the CIA hunt down Al-Qaeda terrorists because they were a shared enemy 
between the two countries.82 
Syria also stood by the Bush administration's decision to go to war in Iraq, which 
is not a surprise since Syria disliked Saddam Hussein. According to the United Nations 
voting summary, Syria was a member of the United Nations Security Council that voted 
in favor of the American and British coalition's invasion ofIraq.83 However, there are 
many sources claiming Syria felt threatened and did not like the American invasion of 
Iraq. The American State Department's view believes Syria opposed the war in Iraq.84 
Moshe Ma'oz describes the Syrian opposition to the Iraq War as a modem source of 
tension between the two countries. He, however, does cite that Syria's yes vote was a 
positive gesture towards America. 85 Yet, Syria remained leery of American interests in 
Iraq. The suspicions were not unjustified. There have been incidents of Syrian soldiers 
and civilians being killed during American missions that went over the Syrian border. 
The United States even disconnected the Syrian-Iraqi oil pipeline.86 With such actions, 
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the Syrian people and government felt the only way to view the Bush administration was 
hostile. 
In early 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that Syria was also 
a member of the "axis of evil" that included Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The basis for 
including Syria was their continued support for terrorism in Israel. 87 The Bush 
administration saw how Syria housed Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the 
Iranian Red Guards, the main fighters in the resistance against Israel. In their minds to 
publicly denounce Syria and force the world to shun them was a proper tactic. Syria was 
now considered a rogue nation that sponsored terrorism. Here is why the Bush tactic was 
a curious position to take. Syria and its state sponsored terrorism was not a direct threat 
to America; antagonizing Syria only hurt the United States position within the Middle 
East and Syria is comprised of mostly Sunni and non-Sunni secularists, not Sunni 
fundamentalists that comprise AI-Qaeda. 88 But to understand the Bush policy, one need 
only look back to 2000. The precedent was set by the peace negotiations that supported 
Israel unflinchingly. The policy, according to Prof. Landis, is to "Reward those who are 
at peace with Israel and hurt those who aren't, like Syria.,,89 So we saw an increase in 
hostility towards Syria, an attempt to contain them, alienate them, and keep Israel more 
powerful. 
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The State Department acknowledged that the 2003 intervention in Iraq was a large 
setback for the two countries and that since then relations have "cooled".90 The 
following years saw the implementation of economic sanctions in 2004 and in 2005 in the 
light of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (the United States 
State Department believes Syria carried out the plot) and the United States recalled its 
ambassador. 91 
The House of Representatives passed The Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act by a vote of398-4 on October 2003.92 In 2004, President 
Bush signed the act into action. The consequences of American and Syrian actions from 
2001-2005 brought the halt of any relations and an atmosphere of hostility. Amidst the 
flurry ofthe anti-Arab scare and belief that almost all Middle East nations were our 
enemy, our electorate and our government turned 180 degrees from its prior policy 
towards Syria. The Syria Accountability Act imposed the following sanctions: a freeze on 
Syrian assets in the United States; a halt to United States business investment in Syria; a 
ban on exports to Syria (except food and medicine); a decrease in diplomatic contacts in 
Syria; a restriction on Syrian diplomats in the United States; and a prohibition on using 
American airports. 93 The American government felt that this was the best way to 
decrease Syrian support for terrorism, attempts to create weapons of mass destruction and 
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influence in Lebanon. Congress and the Bush administration thought that, due to Syria's 
history of sponsoring terrorism and its regional influence, the best hope to curb their clout 
was isolating them. 
In 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated. The American 
response was to formally recall the American ambassador to Syria. After that point the 
Bush administration felt no need to attempt any reconciliation or bilateral discussions 
with Syria. They viewed Syria as hostile and working against American goals in Iraq and 
Israel. The American policy remained hostile despite Syrian president Bashar Assad 
wanting and knowing he needed improved relations with America. Assad desires to 
change Syria's image internationally; he no longer wants to be viewed as a spoiler to 
Middle East peace. Another factor is that Assad understands the importance of American 
aid and support.94 Yet, the way the United States and Syria acted led each other to 
believe neither was capable of being friendly or engaging. 
The actions led to vicious posturing by both sides. Ari Fleischer, former White 
House Press Secretary under Bush, labeled Syria as a "rogue nation." Another Bush 
Administration official said that Syria was "behaving badly.,,95 Syrian Foreign Minister 
Faruq al-Shura said the Bush administration was "the most violent and wicked.,,96 Each 
side was publicly attacking other for their faults. The relationship entered a new low. 
Both sides accused the other. America accused Syria of bad actions in Iraq by not 
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protecting its borders and allowing insurgents across the border. The United States 
labeled Syria as a rogue nation and in the axis of evil. Syria likewise accused America of 
harming Arabs and Syrians. Syria stated that their relations with the United States have 
diminished because the Americans killed Syrian civilians and soldiers. Syria then labeled 
the Bush administration violent and stupid. Both nations felt that they must be hostile 
and unflinching in order to achieve their policy goals. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the drastic decline in the 
American and Syrian relationship. The American invasion of Iraq and America's newest 
policies towards Syria were met with frustration, anger and defiance by Syria. Syria felt 
threatened by the American invasion ofIraq and held a tangible fear of being invaded by 
American forces too. This fear came from the hostility out of Washington; Syria thought 
it might be next to be attacked in accordance with the United States policy of spreading 
democracy. In response to the proximity of the war and its frustration with the Bush 
administration, Syria allowed insurgents to filter into Iraq through Syria.97 It also 
bolstered its relationships with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran in an effort to fight Israel. 
These actions in turn made the United States step up its attempts to control Syria's 
regional influence. The United States established more sanctions and ceased any 
diplomatic contact. Not only have there been no American sponsored peace talks with 
Israel; the United States does not even support a peace between Syria and Israel anymore. 
The American political institution of supporting Israel was elevated into supporting 
Israel's right to the Golan Heights, a piece of land illegally held by Israel according to the 
United Nations. This mindset was established by Syria's support of violence against 
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Israel. Hostility by both sides fed off the most recent remarks or action taken by the 
other. 
Part 4: How the Present Came to Be 
"If the past eight years taught us anything, it is that we gained no leverage by trying to 
ignore Syria and instead ended up isolating the United States" 
~ Senator John Kerry 
The script that began in 1948 when a young Syria first opposed the creation of 
Israel created the first thread that served to drive American/Syrian relations apart. This 
thread was intensified during the course of the Cold War and several military conflicts 
between Israel and Syria. Toward the end of the twentieth century, the United States 
created another thread by making itself responsible for creating a peace between Israelis 
and Arabs. The peace process changed attitudes and opened relations between the United 
States and Syria. It served to continue the goal of protecting Israel by making a peace 
and served to help Syrian! American relations at first. Yet after ten years of "progress" 
the end result was continued hostility and tension. Syria moved into Iran's influence and 
America changed its policy in attempts to isolate and deter Syria from threatening Israel. 
The next thread, created by the Bush administration, moved to an unseen level of support 
for Israel while demonizing Syria. These threads weave together to make the script that 
exists now, which is the poor status of relations with Syria. 
Over the course of the relationship, the events of history created a narrow agenda 
in the minds of the leaders making the present decisions. The Syrian wars with Israel, the 
Syrian alliance with Egypt and the Soviet Union, state sponsoring of terrorism and 
assistance to the Iraqi insurgency made leaders believe they needed to impose sanctions, 
scale back diplomatic relations and isolate Syria. The American support for Israel, Cold 
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War policies and the frustration of the failure of peace negotiations made Syrian leaders 
believe fighting Israel, cooperating with the Soviets, seeking a American brokered peace, 
supporting terrorists and insurgents was how to best proceed. Despite having a full 
spectrum of options, these leaders only considered a limited set because they saw the 
former actions forcing their position. The threads created during the course of the 
relationship such as American support ofIsrael, Syria's determination to force a reason 
Israel should fear it and return the Golan, and American policy of punishing enemies of 
Israel all contributed to this squeezing of choices for leaders to make. 
Over time, this narrowing of options created the downward path in the relations. 
All along the possibility for strengthening the ties was present. This was seen during the 
Clinton administration's peace talks and bilateral meetings with Syria. But the failure of 
that decade of discussion to bear any substantive peace agreement with Syria reclaiming 
the Golan Heights and Israel getting assured its security from Arab resistance groups was 
fatal. The threads always push perspectives towards mistrust and hostility, even when 
people recognize that problem of the current situation. During the 1990's, Syria and 
America sought to establish better ties and realized that it was by ending the Israeli 
conflict that this would happen. But the history of the relationship was too much to 
overcome. America could not push Israel far enough and Syria would not accept a partial 
agreement. The mistrust accumulated over the decades was too much to overcome. 
America would not drop its support of Israeli policy and Syria would not deviate from its 
goal of acquiring the deal it sought. Everyone knew what must be done to break the 
cycle, but it did not get there. Syria stepped up its efforts to thwart Israeli power and 
presence by strengthening support and connections with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. 
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Syria vowed never to be tricked in such a way again and is extremely hesitant to enter 
any peace talks. The United States remained firm in its support for Israel and began its 
policy of punishing Syria for opposing Israel. Syria immediately went from a top priority 
to utter rejection in American policy. The path set at the beginning of the twenty first 
century was too steep. The decisions were being made in such a constricted setting that 
relations fell apart completely. 
The Bush Doctrine and neoconservative approach to dealing with Syria put 
America in a hole in the Middle East. The script that the Bush Era wrote not only 
produced major setbacks to American relations with Syria, it also created new problems. 
Joshua Landis described the current status of the American/Syrian relationship as thus, 
"The American and Syrian relationship is coming out of a really bad patch [of 
events]. The hope under Bush and the neocons was that Syria would fall under a 
Domino Theory that was to start with Iraq. Their policy was to isolate and cut 
Syria offby squeezing it with economic and political sanctions. But this failed 
and the United States out itself in a comer. The world reached out to Syria and 
the United States was left isolated. Now we are crawling back trying to get a 
reward from Syria, but Syria won't reward us because of our bad behavior.,,98 
Here is the direct result of the script that was laid down throughout the years. The 
Bush administration's policy of continuing to back Israel 100% and punish those who 
threaten it produced the sanctions and hostility towards Syria during the 2000's. The 
thread of United States policy under Bush caused the disintegration of American/Syrian 
relations. Syria not only was unfriendly with America, it had allied itself even closer to 
Iran, who America sees as its biggest threat in the region. 
The result of the failed peace and hostility of the past decade is that Syria grew 
closer to Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah in an effort to balance its weakness with Israeli 
98 Landis, Joshua. Telephone interview. 6 Mar. 2010. 
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power. 99 Professor Landis explains that it is an attempt to gain leverage on Israel and get 
Israel's attention on peace with Syria. 100 This means Syria supports Iran's attempt to get 
a nuclear weapon and continues to aid Ramas and Rezbollah in their resistance against 
Israel. Syria continues to send forth contradictory messages. Syria says and indeed, does 
want peace with Israel. It also wanted to improve its relations with America. But its 
actions show the opposite. Supporting violent groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and 
working with Iran only present the United States with the belief that Syria does not want 
peace. As was said earlier and reinforced by Prof. Landis, if a peace can be reached 
between Syria and Israel, then Syria's support of such violent resistance groups and 
efforts will cease. IOI 
Enter President Barack Obama. He inherited the terrible situation left over from 
the eight years of neoconservative policy that isolated and demonized Syria. Joshua 
Landis depicts the situation as 
"Barack Obama is trying to knit back together the relationship dissembled by the 
Bush administration. This is difficult because we won't get a big deal, meaning 
the Golan Heights won't get resolved. So, working within the current restraints, 
America wants to get leverage and that means sending an ambassador to try to 
develop the relationship.,,102 
Obama has already tried to warm relations in his first year in office. As early as 
March 2009 Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, 
traveled to Damascus to "engage with Syrians on the productive role they can play in the 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Landis, Joshua. Telephone interview. 7 Mar. 2010. 
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Middle East.,,]03 The State Department records show that this was the first trip by an 
official ofthis level since 2005.]04 According to the United States State Department, in 
2010 alone Special Envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, and Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Bill Bums, have traveled to Syria and spoken with President Assad. 
The State Department's Office of the Spokesman explained Undersecretary Burns' trip, 
"His [Bums] trip to Syria reflects our continued interest in furthering dialogue with the 
Syrian government on all aspects of our bilateral relationship.,,]05 Obama is mending the 
broken relationship one official at a time, trying to rebuild trust. 
Why does Obama decide that now is the time to change course with Syria? 
Reengagement with Syria appears to be one piece of President Obama's Middle East 
policy. The Obama administration decided to confront issues in the Middle East with 
dialogue and diplomacy. In his June, 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt, President Obama 
said, 
"I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and 
one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not 
be in competition ... But I am convinced that in order to move forward, we must 
say openly to each other the things we hold in our hearts and that too often are 
said only behind closed doors. There must be a sustained effort to listen to each 
other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common 
ground."] 06 
]03 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgnl3580.htm#>. 
]04 "Syria." United States State Department. United States State Department, Feb. 2010. 
Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgnl3580.htm#>. 
]05 Ibid. 
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A renewed relationship with Syria follows the guiding principle of diplomacy 
Obama has adopted. Pursuing Syria fits into the overall plans to complete a peace in the 
Middle East, one ofObama's chief priorities, as well as to play into America's policy of 
isolating Iran. 107 The Obama Administration is using Syria as an example ofre-engaging 
in dialogue, seeking mutual benefits, and progressing American interests with Middle 
East nations. Obama is not abandoning Israel; in fact, he told the Arab world in his Cairo 
address, "America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. 
It is based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a 
Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied.,,108 Obama is 
remaining within the guidelines of America's original policy to protect Israel, but he is 
also seeking to forge alliance with Israe1's neighbors. He is maintaining the objective to 
keep Israel and America safe, but rather than by hostility and military force, as the Bush 
administration preferred, the Obama administration is pursuing positive gains through 
direct diplomacy. 
Obama is reversing course in the American approach to the Middle East, Syria is 
a great example of this departure from the Bush administration's policy. White House 
Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs responded to a question on re-engaging Syria with this, 
"I think you know that we have had a series of meetings with administration 
officials and Syrian leadership. I think this strongly reflects the administration's 
recognition of the role Syria plays and the hope of the role that the Syrian 
107 Labott, Elise. "Mideast envoy Mitchell headed to Syria, State Dept. says." CNN. N.p., 
9 June 2009. Web. 21 Mar. 2010. 
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government can play constructively to promote peace and stability in the region. 
And it continues the President's call to be more fully engaged in the region.,,]09 
President Obama understands Syria's role in the Middle East. He sees that Syria 
is connected to peace and stability with Israel and Iraq. George W. Bush knew this too, 
but his administration's tactic was to force Syria into a peace by rendering it helpless 
without any international support or connections. This however, failed as is seen by 
Syria's strong relationship with Iran. President Obama is taking the opposite approach 
and trying to bring America and Syria closer in order to accomplish both nations' goals. 
Trying to restore direct relations with Syria is important, but another key 
ingredient to the United States' relationship with Syria is our relationship with Israel. 
Obama has been distant toward Israel thus far. He told Israel to stop developing 
settlements in Palestinian land and still has not visited there yet. But despite Obama 
perceptibly loosening America's support oflsraeli action and policy, Congress would 
never allow a change to take effect. As stated by Prof. Landis, "The United States and 
Congress have no interest in putting pressure on Israel. They are content with how things 
are.,,]10 Just like before, the United States is not willing to push Israel to give up the 
Golan and will not punish them for refusing to return it to Syria. 
Professor Greg Orfalea of Georgetown University holds a more optimistic view of 
the Obama administration's message to Israel and Syria. He sees President Obama and 
his administration as making "all the right moves."]]] These moves include sending 
officials, Special Envoy Mitchell, and returning an Ambassador to Syria. It also includes 
109 Gibbs, Robert. "White House Press Briefing." White House. Washington, DC. 24 June 
2009. White House. Web. 16 Mar. 2010. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-irs-commissioner-doug-shulman-and-secretary-e>. 
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the most recent events, which occurred the week of March 8, 2010. Vice President Joe 
Biden went to Israel to visit and show the Obama administration's support for Israeli 
security. While in the midst of his visit, Israel announced plans to build more settlements 
in East Jerusalem. This comes after Israel supposedly put a moratorium on settlement 
building and the Obama administration publicly criticized Israel's settlement policy. 
Biden publicly denounced the Israeli plans; coming mere days after Special Envoy 
George Mitchell announced Palestine and Israel agreed to begin indirect negotiations 
mediated by himself. In the West Bank town of Ramallah, Biden said, "Yesterday the 
decision by the Israeli government to advance planning for new housing units in East 
Jerusalem undermines that very trust, the trust that we need right now in order to begin ... 
profitable negotiations.,,112 Along with Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton had strong words for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to 
the State Department spokesman, P.J. Crowley, Clinton held a 45 minute long 
conversation with Netanyahu and rebuked the Israeli decision to begin developing the 
settlements.,,113 
Prof. Orfalea thinks "the Syrians have to like Obama." He goes on to say that 
"Obama is the first president since Eisenhower who will speak to Israelis sternly and with 
principle that will further world peace and give tough love to so it [Israel] doesn't go over 
the top [against its Arab neighbors.],,114 Obama seems to be trying to create his own 
112 Entous, Adam, and Mohammed Assadi. "Biden Scolds Israel Over Settlement Plan." 
Washington Post. Reuters, 13 Mar. 2010. Web. 10 Mar. 2010. 
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Bilateral Ties." The Washington Post 13 Mar. 2010: AOl. Web. 13 Mar. 2010. 
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adapted version of the script laid out between Syria and America. He is reversing the 
previous policy of disengagement by engaging Syria and he is reversing the Bush policy 
of blindly supporting Israel regardless of its consequences with a rational, larger 
worldview of Israeli actions. 
In essence, we see the propositions of Barrington Moore in action throughout the 
history of American/Syrian relations. There is an initial tension between America and 
Syria caused by the birth of Israel. This tension produces the American goal of 
protecting Israel through its policy of steadfast loyalty and support of the Israeli 
government and military. The enactment of this policy, enhanced by Cold War tension 
over time, was successful in securing Israel from during several military conflicts. These 
military conflicts were new tensions in themselves and further forced perception between 
the two nations. The hostility forced each nation to view the other so negatively that it 
severed diplomatic ties between the United States and Syria at one point. But, as Moore 
explained happens when policy was enacted and adapted, new tensions evolved between 
America and Syria. The adoption of a peace negotiation track for settling the dispute 
between Israel and Syria officially put America in the middle of the two opposing sides. 
From then on, America has been the facilitator and mediator of the peace process, 
enabling America to become much closer to Syria. Yet, as the early 2000's 
demonstrated, this adaptation to relieving the tensions between America and Syria over 
the Israel issue led to worse conditions in the relationship. Syria perceived the situation 
with America as dead; they returned to violence and allied themselves with Iran, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas. The government under George W. Bush forced its view of Syria 
as belligerent and a danger to Israeli and American interests. 
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At this point, the history of the relationship had strained perception on both sides 
so much to the extent that no trust existed between them. The precedents set by the past 
established such a narrow vantage point for both American and Syrian leaders that the 
relationship failed. It failed due to the non-sustainable track it was on, a track surrounded 
with mistrust, differing objectives, and counter-productive policies. Thus, the public 
denouncements made by each country and tension over Israeli security were not a healthy 
and sustainable direction for the relationship to be heading. 
Acknowledging the threads impacted the relationship is the first step toward 
understanding the dynamic of the current American/Syrian relations, knowing why this 
script is important makes it relevant to today's situation. Understanding the script written 
by the history of the American/Syrian relationship and how it forced perceptions among 
leaders establishes a way to recognize and value the relationship. The look at the 
relationship taken in this paper reveals what threads wrote the script of action and 
perception between America and Syria. By knowing what factors impacted the 
relationship and the perception of each nation, one can scrutinize how and why the 
relationship took the course it did. This paper dissected those how and why those factors 
are important to the relationship over time. Understanding the script that developed our 
current relations with Syria enables United States leaders and policymakers to pinpoint 
the aspects of the script to change and improve relations toward working for both Syrian 
and American goals. Knowing how and why the relations became non-sustainable leads 
to a clearer picture of how to reconcile the relationship and improve relations. Knowing 
how the illogical perceptions forced the relations into a path that could not succeed for 
either nation allows those leaders trapped by such irrational thoughts to reconsider their 
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mind set and break out of the box created by the script. Today, Barack Obama appears to 
be doing just this. The Obama administration analyzed the relationship and is adapting 
our policy to forge a new course, all the while remaining within our original policy goals 
of keeping Israeli and American interests secure. 
Part 5: Present Opportunities 
"While there remain a number of serious disagreements between the United States and 
Syria, vigorous diplomatic efforts offer the best way forward and we have much to gain 
strategically by having this diplomatic channel formally open. " 
~ Senator John Kerry 
That is where America and Syria stand now. Even with everything that occurred 
in the past ten years, both Syria and the United States desire to improve their relationship 
and know it is an essential asset for their agendas. Also, regardless of how muddled the 
relationship is, it is salvageable. Throughout the history of American and Syrian 
relations, both countries fundamentally stood for goals that complimented each other. 
The hostility existing between these two countries is the result of perceptions created by 
particular past events. Upon recognizing the influence of these events on today's 
relationship, it becomes apparent that the hostility between the two countries is not 
merely an antiquated legacy of a past age, but also irrational given the objectives of both 
countries. 
Joshua Landis prescribes two options to America's current situation with Syria. 
The first option as he explains it is, "For the United States to continue what it is doing. 
To support Israel in the Golan Heights and skew the balance of power towards Israel by 
arming them against Arab powers and keep Israel from paying a price for its actions. To 
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manage the anger and resentment of Arabs for Israel violating internationa11aw.,,1l5 
Professor Landis believes this is the course that will continue in the near future. He 
states, "The United States won't do it [punish Israel], they have had forty years and 
haven't done it yet. There is no political support in Congress and the American people 
want Israel to have the 1and.,,1l6 From a historical perspective, this line of thinking 
follows the script that was generated since 1948. The United States' ultimate objective is 
the safety of Israel and we will not risk our alliance with them. 
The second option is that "Israel obeys internationa11aw and the United States 
punishes them for not giving up Arab land in return for secure borders."ll7 This is what 
Obama and his administration seem to be hinting at. He can adapt the primary goals of 
the historic policy of supporting Israel and seeking its security by pressuring a peace deal 
that will spread security to most of the region. Prof. Orfa1ea sees the status of 
American/Syrian relations as, "In the right climate, with an atmosphere of respect. And 
with any kind of equitable moves on our [United States] part. Such as, what is currently 
happening with the Israeli settlements, and if we give some aid cut or real penalty to 
Israel. Ifwe get Syria and Israel to a table, then Syrians will come [to peace].,,118 This 
requires a lot of work and trust on all sides of the equation. 
If (at the moment this is still a big if) the United States decides to begin to 
pressure Israel on returning the Golan Heights back to Syria and brings the two countries 
to sit face to face at a table, then the peace process has a legitimate chance. The working 
belief if such a situation comes to pass would be that each side must agree not to incite 
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any challenges to the peace process. Just as Vice President Biden said of the current 
IsraelilPalestinian negotiations, "It is incumbent on both parties to build an atmosphere of 
support for negotiations and not to complicate them.,,119 This would require Syria to put 
a hold on Hamas and Hezbollah for any real, sustained discussions to occur. The 
question of whether Syria has any real control over these groups or merely aids them 
would be critical. But as Prof. Landis said, "Syria can kill the leadership [of Hamas and 
Hezbollah], they can kick them out of Syria, stop arming them, or support the CIA to 
hunt down [leaders].,,120 At the moment, Syria houses the leaders of these two groups, 
helps them hide, and offers them support in Damascus. If Syria needed to, it could crack 
down on these resistance groups and show Israel it is serious about securing the borders. 
The negotiations would require both Syria and Israel to make concessions and 
find a common ground, but as long as Syria gets the Golan back, it will do all it can to 
finish a comprehensive peace agreement. During these peace talks America would 
witness an improvement in its Syrian relations, just as it did during the 1990's under 
Clinton. If the United States can broker a peace deal with Syria and Israel, Syria would 
have almost no reasons to ally itself with Iran, support the resistance groups it currently 
houses and be belligerent to American interests in Iraq. Prof. Landis explains, "If there is 
no war with Israel, Iran would have no role to play [for Syria], there would be no need to 
arm Hamas and Hezbollah.,,121 Syria would no longer have the incentive to antagonize 
and resist Israel if it gets the Golan Heights back and secures peace. 
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The improvement in American/Syrian relations would come during this process 
and be enhanced by the resulting peace. Either as a carrot to begin discussions with 
Israel or as an incentive to reach an accord, the United States must offer to lift the current 
sanctions held on Syria. The end of a war with Israel releases Syria from finding Iran as 
a necessary ally. According to Joshua Landis, "Syria doesn't really want Iran in Iraq. 
But for now it [Syria] helps them [Iran] ... Syria wants to see more Sunnis in the Iraqi 
government but as long as the United States keeps supporting Israel [in the Golan 
Heights] the more Syria thwarts United States and Saudi Arabia by helping Iran.,,122 
Prof. Orfalea also explains the Syrian/Iranian relationship as, "Syrians are not fond of 
Iranians ... Philosophically they don't fit with Iran. They are just playing power 
politics.,,123 The strict secular nature of Sunni Syria does not fit with the fundamental 
Shia regime in Iran. The Israeli peace with Syria would put a wedge in between Syria 
and Iran, allowing room for the United States to augment it's by now good-natured 
relations with Syria. 
A peace with Syria cannot be separated from an Israeli peace with Palestinians. If 
a Syrian peace comes first, it will serve to help push Israel and Palestine to making peace. 
If a Palestinian peace happens first, it will secure a peace between Israel and Syria as 
well. This is because Syria is the lone Arab state to stand by Palestine until it gets land 
and peace with Israel (Egypt and Jordan made peace ).124 Prof. Orfalea states that Syria 
stands by Palestine still because "Syria has land taken from it too and it has ties to 
Palestine - emotional, philosophical, geographical, and it harbors the main Palestinian 
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resistance groups Hamas and Hezbollah.,,125 A Syrian peace is connected to Palestinian 
peace with Israel for those reasons. Prof. Orfalea believes that "Syria will sign a peace 
agreement [with Israel] the day after Palestine does, not a day before.,,126 Regardless of 
which comes first, the Syrian or Palestinian peace, both are aspects of a larger peace. 
They impact and give momentum to each other's peace. 
The end of hostilities between Palestine, Syria and Israel would serve to stabilize 
the much-maligned region and decrease a vast amount of violence. This, after all, is the 
United States' goal, to protect Israel and create a safe and stable region. By improving 
relations with Syria and fostering peace with Israel, the violence that plagued the people 
of Israel and its neighbors would almost cease to exist. This stability carries into Iraq, 
where America is trying to successfully tum over to the Iraqis. Syria has already shown 
interest in good future relations with Iraq and this only helps American objectives within 
Iraq. Syria was the first Arab nation to recognize Iraq and send an ambassador. Joshua 
Landis believes this, in essence, helped to legitimize the Nouri al-Maliki administration, 
the current administration in Iraq. 127 Future relations with Iraq are an incentive for Syria 
to protect its Iraqi border better. This in tum leads to the United States seeing another 
positive action by Syria and only serves to better our relations. Also, without a need to 
aid Iran's agenda in Iraq, Syria loses its major reason for allowing insurgents to spoil 
peace efforts in Iraq, thus reducing yet another aspect of Iran's regional power. Prof. 
Landis discussed Syria's importance to Iranian influence. He said, "Iran's influence 
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would quickly fade without Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah.,,128 It is already clear that 
Syria's alliance with Iran would fade after reaching a peace with Israel, and without that 
necessity of countering Israeli power Syria does not need to aid Iran's plans for Iraq. 
Iran's diminishing influence on Syria is exactly what America wants to see as its 
own relations with Syria take an upswing. This is where the improved relations mean so 
much to America. The United States would now have Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, the new Iraq, and Syria as friends in the region. America could use its influence 
with these nations to stabilize the region and put added pressure on Iran from its Arab 
neighbors. 129 These are all nations that have or will have reached a peace and mutual 
recognition with Israel and Syria would be the centerpiece if this arrangement. It would 
have such an important role because it is Iran's strongest ally. If Syria shows a 
willingness to counter Iranian influence, it sends a strong message to the rest ofthe Arab 
world. 
This sequence of events is difficult to picture and even harder to bring to reality, 
but it is within the reason of possibility. The crux of it all is the improved relations with 
Syria and America. America would still seek its original policy of securing Israel, but 
with the added emphasis on doing so through improved relations with its Arab neighbors 
rather than belligerence. It would require this adaptation of American policy to construct 
such a situation, but the benefits to America and its goals are obvious. It is for this reason 
that there should remain a sense of urgency in fixing American/Syrian relations. If the 
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past continues and Syria remains in the dark, the violence will only continue to afflict 
Israel, Iraq and American troops in the Middle East. It will also enable Iran to continue 
increasing its sway in the region. History has shown that the peace process is capable of 
bringing America and Syria closer; if the process is successful, it will open better avenues 
for our relationship such as security in Iraq and Israel. There is hope and as Prof. Orfalea 
stated when asked ifhe believes Obama can produce a peace between Syria and Israel 
within the next eight years, "I think he can do it in four.,,130 
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